Abstract Societal marketing emerged in the early 1970s, promising a more socially responsible and ethical model for marketing. While the societal marketing concept has attracted its adherents and critics, the literature on societal marketing has remained sketchy and underdeveloped, particularly with respect to its underlying (and largely implicit) moral agenda. By making the moral basis of societal marketing more explicit, this article primarily seeks to offer a moral critique of the societal marketing concept. By situating discussion within notions of psychological and ethical egoism, argues that, in moral terms at least, the societal marketing concept is clearly an extension of the marketing concept, rather than a fundamental reconstruction of marketing theory. While acknowledging the use of the societal marketing concept in practice, this use is problematized with respect to a number of critical moral issues. In particular, the question of who should and can decide what is in the public's best interests, and elucidate the moral deficiencies of the rational-instrumental process upon which marketing decisions are frequently rationalised. Suggests that attention should be refocused away from prescribing what``moral'' or``societal'' marketing should be, and towards developing an understanding of the structures, meanings and discourses which shape and explain marketing and consumption decision making and sustain its positive and negative impacts on society.
Introduction
The dominant model of marketing, based on the notion of consumer sovereignty, assumes that the role of the marketing process is technical rather than moral in nature ± its purpose is to translate demand into production, not to legislate on what demand or production might be``good'' (Dixon, 1992) . This is largely the marketing``science'', as derived from the Harvard University economic school of thought (Jones and Monieson, 1990 ) and subsequently presented in major textbooks, and as traditionally taught in business schools (Desmond, 1998) . However, during the 1960s, constituencies critical of marketing emerged and grew in power and influence (see Kotler, 1972; Levy and Zaltman, 1975; Gabriel and Lang, 1995, pp. 152-72; Arnold and Fisher, 1996) . While many marketers became defensive about such developments, the upshot of this was a series of attempts (both theoretical and practical) to address these criticisms (see, for example, Dawson, 1969; Lazer, 1969; Spratlen, 1970; Bell and Emory, 1971; Feldman, 1971; Sweeney, 1972) . Philip Kotler was central to these efforts to incorporate social and moral concerns into marketing`s cience'', and his contribution can be bracketed in two ways. First, he proposed an extension of the marketing technologies into non-business arenas (Kotler and Levy, 1969) . Thus, in prompting marketers to benefit society by Societal marketing and morality
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considering the marketing of social ideas and causes, the notion of social marketing was introduced (Kotler and Zaltman, 1971) [1] . Second, in association with other``reconstructionists'' (including Berry, Sweeney and Spratlen) he argued that the marketing concept and its technologies must be tempered, and ultimately revised, by adopting a more explicit social orientation (Arnold and Fisher, 1996) . Thus, the societal marketing concept (SMC) was born (see Kotler, 1972 ). Kotler's (1972) initial definition of societal marketing called for marketers to provide in addition to the basic elements of the marketing concept ± customer satisfaction and profitability ± a third element, which he called``long-run consumer welfare''. By doing so, Kotler was acknowledging the argument that what was good for individual consumers might not be good for society (Levy and Zaltman, 1975; Dixon, 1992) . This lack of concern for social welfare was ostensibly illustrated by: the incidence of pollution and congestion as a result of individual car purchase; poor nutrition due to a reliance on junk food; excessive waste resulting from throw-away convenience packaging; and health problems due to the consumption of harmful tobacco and alcohol products (p. 54). The key assumption here was that consumers' immediate``desires'' were in some ways distinguishable from their longer-term``interests''. According to Kotler, while marketers had been successful in satisfying the former, the emergence of consumer advocate groups and other voices critical of marketing suggested that, thus far, they had been unsuccessful in terms of the latter. Societal marketing thus promised a fundamental reconstruction of marketing, suggesting the possibility of a more ethical marketing approach, which embraced rather than excluded public concerns (Kotler, 1972; Abratt and Sacks, 1988) . In this paper, we seek to re-examine this proposition and, some 30 years since the publication of Kotler's landmark paper, consider the extent to which this reconstruction has been achieved. In order to do so, we shall examine the impact the SMC has had on marketing theory and practice, elucidate the ethical basis of the SMC as evidenced in the extant theoretical literature, and identify the morality underpinning societal marketing as it occurs in practice [2] .
While sympathetic to its avowed aims, the resulting critique of societal marketing puts into serious question its moral foundations and outcomes. We conclude that, while the SMC is based on different and arguably more solid moral terrain than the marketing concept, the concept raises some fundamental, perhaps irreconcilable, difficulties. Hence, we suggest that, rather than attempting to articulate what societal marketing``should'' be (and why), academics would be better advised to research decision-making processes in relation to the production/consumption contexts in order to understand the different moral bases which are drawn on in enacting and rationalising real marketing decision making. This research would, in our view, help develop an understanding of complex social and cultural processes and provide insight into how they might be made morally meaningful, and/or subjected to appropriate forms of governance and accountability.
In the next section, the theory and practice of societal marketing will be briefly introduced and this will form the basis of a more extended examination of the moral basis of societal marketing. The paper will then go on to discuss the criticisms of societal marketing theory, before taking a look at the moral terrain of societal marketing practice. In the final part of the paper, our possibilities of developing a potentially more informed moral view of marketing theory and practice will be discussed.
Theory and practice of societal marketing Kotler's (1972) seminal article in the Harvard Business Review effectively launched the SMC as an academic concept in the mainstream marketing literature. This is not meant to suggest that social concerns and/or the consumer's long-term interests had been entirely absent from the marketing literature before this, but rather that an explicit orientation towards them had not been incorporated into the marketing orthodoxy promulgated by mainstream textbooks and journals (we shall examine these historical roots of marketing theory in more depth later in the paper). Of course, social concerns of one kind and another had clearly been of consequence to various marketing practitioners prior to the publication of Kotler's paper. However, although there is evidence to suggest that some marketers may at times have acted in certain consumers' interests long before this (for example, firms such as Kellogg's, Nestle Â, Merck, Johnson & Johnson, and various others have all long-declared intentions to promote healthy, nutritious, safe and/or socially valuable products), Kotler's views of mainstream marketing may be seen as being justifiable in the context of a long history of disreputable marketing practices (see Packard, 1957; Farmer, 1967; Tsalikis and Fritzsche, 1989; Laczniak and Murphy, 1993) , the criticisms of the consumerism and counterculture movements of the 1960s (see Arnold and Fisher, 1996) , and a regulatory environment predicated on caveat emptor (Smith, 1995) .
Kotler's main emphasis at this time was on setting out the type of products that might or might not be appropriate to a societal marketing orientation. By defining product benefits in terms of short-run consumer satisfaction and longrun consumer welfare, he claimed that there were essentially four types of products. These were:
(1) Deficient products, which he said offered neither short-nor long-term benefits; (2) Salutary products, which had low immediate appeal but high long-term consumer benefit; (3) Pleasing products, which gave high immediate satisfaction but could cause harm in the long term; and (4) Desirable products, which combined immediate satisfaction with longrun benefit.
These are shown in Table I . Kotler suggested that, for the implementation of the SMC, deficient products should be deleted from the product range Societal marketing and morality
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altogether; salutary and pleasing products should undergo product modification in order to move them towards the top right-hand quadrant; and the development of desirable products should be the ultimate aim of marketing efforts. As the author (or co-author) of a series of bestselling textbooks on marketing principles and marketing management, Kotler has continued to retain the SMC within basic marketing theory. This is not to say that his definitions of societal marketing have not evolved and, by the time the``Millennium edition'' of his Marketing Management (Kotler, 2000) had been released, the concerns of the SMC had moved beyond``long-term consumer welfare'' to embrace more specifically``society's wellbeing''. Thus,``the societal marketing concept calls upon marketers to build social and ethical considerations into their marketing practices'' (Kotler, 2000, p. 25) . Since Kotler's texts are so prominent in marketing pedagogy, and since the SMC is also quoted in other marketing textbooks, it might appear that societal marketing had become a central concept in contemporary marketing theory. Dixon (1992) , however, challenges this view, citing the failure to incorporate social and ethical concerns throughout marketing texts (as opposed to just in a single chapter), the ignoring and distortion of macromarketing issues by most textbooks, and the commonly cited defence of the marketing concept, which assumes a highly contestable correlation between private and public good in marketing exchanges. Indeed, if the contribution of the SMC is to be found in its widening of attention away from the satisfaction of individual desires to longer-term social and individual interests, the continued preoccupation of marketing texts on customer satisfaction and profitability suggests that the SMC has yet to have anything more than, at best, a marginal impact on the traditional principles of marketing theory.
In fact, on the face of it, there has been very little advance in the societal marketing literature since the early 1970s. The initial flurry of interest soon waned and little more than a handful of articles specifically addressing societal marketing appeared from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. However, those that have appeared have generally been well cited with Sacks (1988, 1989) and Prothero (1990) being probably the most influential. That is not to say that these treatments have sought to refine or even to redefine our understanding of societal marketing. Rather, they have served more as restatements (see Abratt and Sacks, 1988) , views from industry (see Abratt and Sacks, 1989) , or applications (e.g. to environmental issues, see Prothero (1990) ). One could argue that this is simply semantic quibbling, that the attention afforded to social, ethical and green marketing etc. is related to, or an upshot of, the introduction of the SMC. However, we feel that this would be missing the point. The majority of the research that has gone under the guise of thesè`o ther'' marketings has not attempted to reconstruct the moral basis of marketing in the same way as the SMC, nor has it tended to refocus the goals of marketing away from individual consumer satisfaction to a wider social good. For instance, those concerned with social and not-for-profit marketing have cultivated conceptual boundaries, which largely exclude the for-profit marketing of consumer products from their research/practice domain. Considerations of (un)ethical marketing have primarily been concerned with normative and positive evaluations of specific marketing activities such as targeting, advertising and pricing as opposed to wider macro questions of the morality and legitimacy of marketing itself (Robin and Reidenbach, 1993; Crane, 2000a: pp. 7-29) . And similarly, the majority of green marketing research (with a few notable exceptions) has been shown to have focused on the problems of targeting and satisfying green consumers rather than fundamental reconsideration of the social and moral role of marketing (Kilbourne and Beckmann, 1998; Crane, 2000b) .
Overall, then, it appears that the societal marketing literature has to date made a very limited contribution to marketing theory and practice. As Arnold and Fisher (1996, p. 132) conclude, the hopes and challenges presented by new concepts such as societal marketing in the late 1960s and early 1970s have more or less evaporated:
Although the sixties had a powerful influence on the development of marketing thought, we are left wondering exactly what it is that we have learned. For all the expressions of idealism and hope embodied in the sixties experience, marketing, some 25 years later, still seems to be firmly fixated on its place in business. For marketing academicians it appears to be business as usual.
Certain elements of societal marketing theory have, however, been taken up. For example, some elements within the marketing academy have acknowledged (often without reference to the SMC) that marketing should embrace a more social and ethical agenda (e.g. Robin and Reidenbach, 1987;  Societal marketing and morality 553 Smith, 1990 Smith, , 1995 Smith and Quelch, 1993; Laczniak, 1993; Laczniak and Murphy, 1993) . Indeed there is considerable evidence to suggest that many firms have succeeded to some extent in combining social and economic goals through their marketing activity. For example, at one level, we might think of the numerous cases of cause-related marketing reported in the literature, such as American Express's Charge Against Hunger programme, which saw the company donating 3 cents to the hunger-relief organization Share Our Strength every time someone used the card (Andreasen, 1996) . Perhaps more significantly, we might think of Menon and Menon's (1997) ``enviropreneurial'' marketers, who have been argued to have achieved fundamental environmental improvements in their products at the same time as impressive economic success. Similarly, Crane (2000a) reports on``social mission companies'', which have (not always successfully) attempted to combine product marketing with social cause campaigning. Abratt and Sacks (1989) have even gone so far as to cite alcohol firms as societal marketers, given their attempts to promote responsible drinking. But how and in what way does the SMC fit into such practice? Do these represent fundamentally new ways of marketing, or are they just more of the same? And what do these examples tell us about the moral basis of the SMC? These issues are discussed next.
Societal marketing theory and morality
Despite the initial emphasis in the societal marketing literature of the early 1970s on presenting a more moral and humanistic approach to marketing, the underlying moral basis of the concept has remained implicit and very much under-developed. If the concept of societal marketing has been largely unsuccessful in driving the academic marketing agenda, does this mean that the concept has failed? In this section we will argue conversely that societal marketing is alive and well and is in daily use in profit-based and, increasingly, in not-for-profit institutions. By exploring its ethical foundations, we suggest that, far from being a radical departure in marketing thought, the SMC is constituted as being representative of the same selfinterested, rational-instrumental approach, which is characteristic of thè`H arvard'' marketing tradition. We argue that morally this represents a logical extension from traditional marketing theory (rooted in neo-classical economic theory), whose (largely unstated) moral basis rests on psychological egoism towards a more morally robust basis of ethical egoism. We further contend that, while the SMC may hold out some possibilities for developing a more moral approach in some instances, its fundamental assumptions, coupled with its very dependence on a set of rational-instrumentalist justifications, will not prevent, and may even lead to, morally dubious and even dangerous outcomes.
Moral bases for marketing
First we must demonstrate that there is a link between the SMC and morality. While Kotler did not manifest a relation between societal marketing and morality, his shift from the traditional to the societal marketing concept indexes a shift in the moral plane from a focus on psychological to one based on ethical egoism. This shift may be clarified by considering the SMC within the context of the different and often implicit moral positions adopted by marketing theorists. Jones and Monieson (1990) trace the academic roots of the subject of marketing to the late nineteenth century and to the development of two economic schools of thought at the University of Wisconsin and at Harvard. The Wisconsin group, many of whom were German-educated, headed à`r eformist'' movement, which spearheaded the development of the American Economic Association as a protest against (UK) laissez-faire economics. While the economists at Wisconsin worked closely with the State, those at Harvard, who were also influenced by the German Historical School, developed a more managerialist orientation through establishing the first Business School in the USA. It was here that the``discipline'' of marketing formed around the development of``marketing science'' ± an inductive research programme calculated to yield general principles of marketing and a``case'' approach to teaching.
The link with neo-classical economics: fostering self-interest From a moral perspective, marketing was informed then by two positions: à`r eformist'' position, which maintained that marketers should work in the overall interests of society by aiding the State regulation of the marketplace (Wisconsin) and a laissez-faire view (Harvard) that one should entrust morality to the actions of individuals, who, by``freely'' (of regulation) pursuing their rational self-interests, would thereby set in motion the``hidden hand'' of the marketplace and thus ensure the best possibility for ethical outcomes. This latter approach is first exemplified in Adam Smith's classic text, The Wealth of Nations (1793). In his chapter on the Division of Labour, Smith considers how, of all the different species, man is reliant on others for his sustenance. However, he should not rely on the benevolence of others for this but rather:
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this: give me that which I want and you shall have this which you want is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages (Smith, 1793, pp. 21-22) [3].
By placing self-love and the satisfaction of wants at the core of his proposition, Smith is advancing a form of psychological egoism ± this is the way the good society is and ought to be. Basically, this presupposes that one can get what one wants by giving other people what they want. Smith paradoxically locates the best possibility for societal wellbeing in the self-interested transactions of Societal marketing and morality 555 sovereign economic actors in the marketplace. Underlying this is a deep-rooted concern for social welfare, coupled with a fundamental abhorrence of anything that might create friction in the market system, especially State intervention. Almost two centuries later, Smith's argument was vigorously adopted and espoused by neo-classical economists of the New Right, including Milton Friedman, who argued furiously against growing State intervention during the 1960s in Western economies, which has continued apace in the following decade. Like Smith (1793), Friedman (1962) and Friedman and Friedman (1980) advanced the view that ecological and consumer concerns (among others) could best be addressed through economic actors seeking to fulfil their own desires in the marketplace. Smith's thesis supposes that all human actions can ultimately be explained in terms of underlying individual desires. However, in contrast, it could be argued that many people do not actively choose that which is most pleasing to them. For example, someone may find it pleasing to smoke tobacco, but forgo consumption of cigarettes, because they know that it is in their long-term interests to do so. Another person may enjoy eating fish but may reduce their consumption of fish in order to conserve fish stocks. A third may avoid purchasing products which they believe to be fabricated by exploited labour, as they may believe that it would not be in the long-term interests of society to do so. While either action could be legitimately deemed rational, from an ethical point of view, the focus on interests represents a form of ethical egoism (as opposed to psychological egoism, which concerns itself with the satisfaction of desires or wants). For many writers on ethics, ethical egoism is regarded as à`s trong'' position from which to argue in that it is based on the recognition that the individual acts in her best interests (not desires) and seems to employ the idea of objective value (Graham, 1990, p. 26 ).
The``Harvard'' tradition: marketing as satisfaction of self-interest From our earlier discussion of morality in marketing, it can be argued that a dual approach to morality and marketing persisted through the course of the twentieth century. Those from what we might loosely describe as thè`H arvard'' tradition embraced the psychological egoism inherent in Smith's (1793) writings. The message was simple: the proper locus of morality is vested in economic agents, each acting, either narrowly or widely, in his or her own self-interest, untrammelled by the power of State intervention. As we will demonstrate in more detail, this view underpins various descriptions of thè`m arket orientation'' offered by marketing academics and the idea of thè`m arketing concept''. On the other hand, those who follow in the``Wisconsin'' tradition are sceptical of the ability of the market to regulate itself, and instead insist that, where necessary, the State must intervene through legislative and other programmes. As we shall see, both of these traditions have influenced each other ± in particular the threat of imminent legislation has influenced the psychological egoists, who have tended to respond with calls for marketers in firms to be more zealous in following marketing-led precepts and principles and in implementing the marketing concept more fully. Kotler's (1972) development of societal marketing can be interpreted within this context as part of the response to increasing social discontent and imminent legislation. As such, Kotler's development of the SMC represents an attempt to shift the moral basis of mainstream marketing from the psychological egoism advanced by earlier apostles of the marketing concept (based on serving consumer desires) to a form of ethical egoism (based on satisfying long-run consumer interests and welfare). This was meant to suggest not so much that consumers'`d esires'' were irrational, but more that (at least according to Kotler, 1972, p. 54) , because marketers were so successful in making their products immediately appealing and gratifying, consumers``cannot resist'' these temptations in the economic realm of consumption, and seek therefore to``express their discontent as voters'' ± thereby precipitating regulatory action.
Let us offer some brief evidence in support of the claim we are making. To restate this briefly, the``Harvard'' tradition is a logical development of psychological egoism, which takes the view that the marketer acts in his or her own self-interest by appealing to the self-interest of consumers. Take as our first example the following from``guru'' Theodore Levitt:
This book is not a do-gooder treatise on how to be a better citizen by serving society better. It is intended as a tough-minded explanation, outline, and example of how to serve yourself better by serving the customers better (Levitt, 1962, p. 8) .
Writing several years later Bower (1970) reinforces the view that marketing shapes the firm's ability to survive by sharpening its competitive edge:
Typically, the smaller company cannot depend for a competitive edge on lower costs and lower prices. It can, however, be more sensitive to customer needs and wants, provide better customer service, and establish closer customer relations (Bower, 1970, pp. 1-4) .
If one explores the various``phase'' theories of marketing which were fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s, self-interest is offered as the primary motivation for the shift to a marketing orientation. For example, one can read in both Kotler (1972) and Lipson and Paling (1974) the preoccupation with the main concerns of the day. These also formed the basis for the interest of State legislators and of economists such as Friedman. Kotler based his argument for the SMC on the rise in power and importance of the consumer movement, and the subsequent need for business to see this as an``opportunity'' rather than a threat. This view is shared by Lipson and Paling:
The mid-twentieth century has been marked by intense demonstrations, both violent and non-violent, by individuals who want to influence the quantity and quality of their market transactions. People in underdeveloped areas and in low income or low-status groups openly legislate for change. They want to influence and shape their lives, including their market transactions. New legislation is being proposed and enacted to insure a better quality and quantity of market transactions for every American. Investigations of many areas, including insurance, medical care and home improvements, have been made by the President of the United States. The demand of customers to be recognized as individuals has led to a customer market orientation (Lipson and Paling, 1974, pp. 9-10) .
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This self-same self-interest led Kotler to develop the SMC as a reaction to events that were unfolding on the ground at the time. While the tenor of the SMC itself is essentially proactive, the fact that Kotler's work is essentially reactive is worth noting. While one could argue that he was saying something new, in that he argued that firms should substitute a regard for consumers' long-run interests and not their desires, one should bear in mind that the notion of interests was also at the centre of McKitterick's (1957) initial formulation of the marketing concept (which places the remit on firms to be``skilful in conceiving and then making the business do what suits the interests of the customer''). However, Kotler is quite clear that the ultimate interest is that of the producer:
The addition of long-run consumer welfare asks the businessman to include social and ecological considerations in his product and market planning. He is asked to do this not only to meet his social responsibilities but also because failure to do this may hurt his long-run interests as a producer (Kotler, 1972, p. 55) .
Or, as he puts it in summary form:
The enlightened marketer attempts to satisfy the consumer and enhance his total wellbeing on the theory that what is good in the long run for consumers is good for business (Kotler, 1972, p. 57 ).
The self-interest argument threads through the subsequent literature on this topic with Sacks (1988, 1989) , for example, going to some lengths to emphasise that societal marketing should in no way interfere with long-term profitability. Similarly Prothero (1990) emphasises how the social, ethical and ecological demands of consumers will be increasingly manifested in purchase decisions, thus suggesting an even greater instrumental reason for firms to embrace the SMC. As the firms' own self-interest (survival) represents the ultimate long-run interest, the focus on consumer interests and societal welfare is conditional. Thus, one may interpret the SMC as saying that it may be important for firms to take into account the long-run interests of consumers and that this may only apply to some bands of consumers (i.e. those who are bothered enough by such issues to join the consumer movement or environmental interest groups). Conditionality is determined by the need for the marketer to reflect what is in the espoused self-interest of groups of consumers in the marketplace. This argument has probably best been explicated by Houston (1986) with respect to the marketing concept [4] . Some consumers will not care about the environment; others will pay lip-service to ecological concerns by saying one thing and doing another; others will be more heavily committed to such concerns through membership of formal groups and even action. The SMC could thus be relatively narrowly interpreted as suggesting that, for those firms which wish to serve the self-interest of this latter group, it makes sense to develop and maintain a sincere commitment to sustainable marketing (provided that a profit can be turned). With respect to this narrow interpretation where the firm is reacting to the espoused interests of a constituency group, the self-interest position suggests the necessity of maintaining a balance between society and the producer. But what happens when the goals of these two constituencies clash? Gaski (1985, p. 43) , for example, notes that there would be little need for societal marketing, if profitability were perfectly convergent with the public interest. Also, what would happen if those who defend the interests of society (well-intentioned consumers, consumer groups, pressure groups and the like) fail to secure enough power, voice or resources to make it worthwhile for marketers to take social concerns seriously? Societal marketing theory is largely silent on these points, and we can only assume that the firm would retreat to the psychological egoism which underpins the traditional marketing concept by means of which it would seek to maximise profits by effectively satisfying consumers' needs (both short-and long-term).
A wider interpretation: dangerous moral territory?
So far we have considered the case of the firm which has adopted an SMC perspective by reacting to the espoused concerns of a constituency group. A wider interpretation of the SMC would suggest that the firm act proactively in seeking to identify consumer and societal interests. The difficulty here in the societal marketing literature is its failing to address the question of whose interests societal marketing is supposed to be serving. If societal marketing is predicated on the assumption that marketing should aim to protect and further consumer welfare, who should decide what is, and is not, in the consumer's interest? Gaski's (1985) critique of the SMC posits this question, suggesting that it puts marketers into dangerous moral territory. His argument is essentially a restatement of Friedman's (in)famous invective against social responsibility (Friedman, 1962 (Friedman, , 1970 . The main contentions are that the SMC constructs a role for the marketing manager to decide on and act in defence of the public interest, despite neither being elected to do so, nor necessarily having any expertise in doing so. In many respects the argument is sound: politicians are elected to act on behalf of citizens, marketers are not. So why should, and how can, the latter be held accountable for their societal actions? Social policy skills are rarely a prerequisite for a marketing manager post, so why should society trust their faith in marketers? And finally, there is always a concern that firms have already achieved such a powerful position in society that any extension of their role into the social arena is likely to lead to fears over the corporate sector acting as``Big Brother'' with respect to definitions of``welfare'' or``consumer interest''.
Despite addressing serious problems with the SMC, Gaski's (1985) argument ± and by implication Friedman's (1962 Friedman's ( , 1970 ± have subsequently been met with wholesale rejection in the marketing literature (see Abratt and Sacks, 1988; Prothero, 1990; Samli, 1992) . However, this is not so surprising when we look at the conclusions he reaches:
If the greatest overall wellbeing of society in general is the objective and if democratic values are respected, then the appropriate course of action for marketing managers is to ignore considerations of what is in the public interest, to concentrate on . . . satisfying customers as Societal marketing and morality 559 efficiently as possible until instructed to do otherwise by the public itself . . . through either public pressure or regulation. . . . The social responsibility of marketing, then, is to forget about social responsibility. The alternative is intolerably dangerous (Gaski, 1985, p. 45 ) (Original emphasis).
For those academics who advance the cause of societal marketing, the prospect of``forgetting'' about social responsibility is anathema. However, at the same time, by highlighting public pressure for social responsibility, they have merely echoed Gaski's sentiments: Kotler (1972) by emphasising the importance of the consumer movement; Prothero (1990) and Peattie (1995) , among others in the green marketing literature, by arguing similarly in relation to``green'' consumers. While there is some substance to these critiques of Gaski, we would argue that these authors share Gaski's basic orientation. None of these authors rejects an essentially egoistic basis for marketing morality. From an ethics point of view, their difference with Gaski is thus not one of substance but rather one of degree. While those such as Gaski, following Friedman and Friedman (1980) and Smith (1793) , take a narrow view of what constitutes the self-interest of firms, societal marketers take a broader view. Gaski and his critics present us with only two choices ± either marketing managers alone decide what is in our interests, or they must not even consider such questions. Nonetheless, other possibilities do exist and can be found in contemporary marketing practice. Before proceeding to the last element of our critique of societal marketing, let us therefore discuss these approaches. First, we have the basic position advocated by the SMC, namely that marketing managers themselves should decide what is in society's (and consumers') best interests. Many organizations appear to be practising this particular approach, whether they harbour strong societal aspirations or not. For example, widely cited examples of societal marketing firms, such as Ben & Jerry's, Tom's of Maine and the Body Shop, have all claimed to have followed the instincts and drives of their leaders in deciding which products to produce (see Roddick, 1992; Chappell, 1993; Lager, 1994) . Equally, Abratt and Sacks' (1989) examination of firms in the alcoholic beverage market showed them relying primarily on internal decision-making processes to decide how to continue marketing their socially problematic products. However, such accounts tend to be overly individualistic and endogenous to the firm, in that they locate the motivation to act morally to voluntary action freely undertaken by organizational personalities. This can downplay the role played by exogenous pressures operative within the institutional context of the firm, which, in threatening the firm's``bottom-line'' performance, can subsequently enable organizational actors to see the light. For example, one might suggest that Barclays Bank and Nestle Â would not have made``enlightened'' decisions without the application of severe external pressures from ELTSA and INFACT, respectively, in addition to a range of governmental and nongovernmental pressures. One might add to these a string of manufacturers and retailers whose recent development of ethical codes in relation to labour practices has been prompted by investigation by labour activists and subsequent media exposure. Furthermore, it seems that such investigation must be continued, if the code is to be anything more than window-dressing (Ortega, 1999) . In our view, rational calculation of self-interest will always involve a review (and indeed a reaction) of current and potential actions by others who have the power to threaten one's survival. Thus it would be most surprising if Anita Roddick's``enlightened'' policies were not sharpened by the activities of journalist John Entine.
A second possibility, as advocated by Prothero (1990) , is where the firm tracks the social concerns of consumers. A number of firms have done this in recent years, with the Co-op Bank and CWS in the UK representing two of the more prominent examples. In both cases, the company preceded an ethical branding initiative with extensive surveys ascertaining the importance to customers of various potential issues which could be addressed by the firm, such as animal welfare, the environment, fair trade, and the supply of weapons (Harvey, 1995; Kitson, 1996; CWS, 1995) . These surveys have subsequently fed into (societal) marketing decision making. Clearly, this approach is strongly based on egoism, for it rests on the assumption that the firm will benefit by addressing only those causes identified as important by one's customers. Managing director of the Cooperative Bank, Terry Thomas, for example, made this strikingly evident in the launch of the ethical branding initiative, claiming,``There's no denying that this is a marketing initiative. Why else do it?'' (cited in Jack, 1992) .
A third possibility also focuses on consumers, but in this case ostensibly allows customers themselves to directly``decide'' which products should continue to be produced through their purchase decisions. Of all the possibilities discussed, this follows most closely in the liberal tradition advocated by Adam Smith. In this view the``hidden hand'' of the market intervenes to create the best (or least-worst) solution. Hence, a fall in demand for products deemed by consumers to be socially undesirable will result in them leaving the market, and equally a demand for socially desirable products (accompanied by a willingness to pay for them) will result in such products being successfully marketed. While this ignores Kotler's (1972) original distinction between consumers' short-term desires and long-term needs, as well as the question of whether consumers truly have the degree of sovereignty necessary to ensure such an outcome (Smith, 1990 (Smith, , 1995 Dixon, 1992; Knights et al., 1994) , this has clearly been a dominant assumption of much of the existing``green'' marketing theory and practice (Kilbourne et al., 1997; Peattie, 1999) . Indeed, freedom to choose is seen as the ultimate repository of`g oodness'' by the free market economists, suggesting (but as we have shown not necessarily corresponding to) a passive role for the marketer.
The fourth possibility evident in current marketing practice is where the State will make the decision as to which products should be provided, and how they should be marketed. For example, tobacco firms have resisted calls for them to cease the supply of cigarettes, but have faced increasing Government regulations regarding how they can promote cigarette products (see, for example, Abratt and Sacks, 1989) . We have also recently seen the case in Societal marketing and morality
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Europe of the farming industry refusing to self-regulate the sale of beef products in the face of BSE scares, prompting government action banning the sale and import of beef in a number of European countries. Here we see echoes of Kotler's fears concerning increased regulation in response to insufficient selfregulation. However, there are few (if any) industries that passively accept any form of regulatory encroachment, and lobbying remains a potent force in resisting further regulation of marketing activities. For instance, following a 2000 British Medical Association report linking anorexia with depictions of excessively thin fashion models in the media, the fashion industry successfully (and vehemently) argued against the establishment of even a voluntary code proposed by the UK Government to regulate fashion ads (McIntosh, 2000; McSmith, 2000) . This would suggest that the Wisconsin model of societal marketing, whereby marketers actively work with the State in ensuring social welfare, is still rare in practice. Finally, firms might respond to the demands of pressure groups and the media in deciding their marketing strategies. For example, the late 1990s have witnessed a growth in pressure group activity against genetically modified (GM) food, leading to widespread public and media criticism. In response, all the major UK supermarkets eventually responded with self-imposed bans on GM ingredients, whereas the supplying companies such as Monsanto relied on internal constituencies (and government approbation) to determine a stance of no-change. Do the supermarket and Monsanto responses represent different approaches to societal marketing? In a sense they do, for the former appear to have embraced a certain level of openness to, and acceptance of, the views of (at least some) civil society organizations that the latter have not. However, we must also recognise that each is still rooted in egoist principles: the supermarkets considering social welfare in order to avoid a loss of consumer trust; Monsanto seeking to foster acceptance for a product technology that would have enormous consequences for their subsequent economic performance.
Each of these five approaches has some value as a way of approaching societal marketing, but alone they fail to present a new moral basis for marketing. Indeed, they leave us with the pressing question as to whether the consumer, the manager, the regulator, or the civil actor offers a better hope of achieving a more moral society. Unfortunately, societal marketing, as it stands both in theory and in practice, appears to present no obvious or comprehensive answers. This, to some extent, is due to the inherent problems in attempting to categorise individual products and artefacts as acting for or against social/consumer interest. In a pluralistic society, this is no easy matter, and any attempts to curtail the marketing of``bad'' products are inevitably going to be met with a defence predicated on allowing capable consumers the freedom to choose for themselves. Clearly, though, while the basis of all variants of societal marketing appears to be rooted in such egoist reasoning, the concept presupposes at least some consideration of social and moral responsibility on the part of marketers. In the following section we briefly outline several further points of concern about the ability of the SMC to accommodate such responsibility.
Societal marketing and moral responsibility
The first of these linked concerns is that the concept's insistence on the role of the individual moral agent veils the social context and in particular the imbalance in size and power relations between individuals and corporations. Referring to``the marketer'' in the same way as Adam Smith refers to``the butcher'' and``the baker'' is disingenuous, unless by``butcher'' we are referring to the Chicago meat trade and by``baker'' to Rank-Hovis McDougall. However, what is veiled by the above is not simply the fact that marketers often work for corporations involving hundreds, thousands and indeed hundreds of thousands of people but, more importantly, the implications which this has for the exercise of individual moral responsibility and action. While one can accept the idea that the individual is a moral agent, such agency is easily``floated'' within such groupings where the individual is a mere cog in an enormous wheel (Bauman, 1993) . Within marketing, the floating of individual moral responsibility is further exacerbated, as marketing decisions frequently involve people from agencies which are both internal and external to the organization, such as advertising, PR and through the line agencies (Desmond, 1998) . As Bauman (1993) notes, where the individual within the organization does experience a conflict of interest, their loyalties and sympathies fall usually on the side of their colleagues and not with those who are perceived to bè`o ther'' or external to the organization. A third concern is that managers are mainly called upon to adopt``socially responsible'' behaviours for the same reasons as those for which they are called on to adopt the marketing concept, i.e. profitability, which is the measure of`s elf-interest''. The rational-instrumental approach that is involved in the calculation of marketing costs and values is adiaphoric (Bauman, 1993) in that it renders decisions morally neutral. The adoption of the SMC may thus equally result in the adoption of moral behaviour on the part of a firm which can clearly see that to act in the interests of others is to act in its own self-interest. On the other hand, where its own self-interest is not clearly served, there is no call for such an approach. The key issue is that it effaces the``face'' of the``other'' and so facilitates the treatment of this``other'', whether human or not, as an object. This is not speculation but can be confirmed by recent research. Even where corporate marketing decisions have resulted in``moral'' outcomes, evidence suggests that the managers involved seek to deliberately downplay, avoid or reframe any moral meaning such as to``amoralize'' the marketing process (Crane, 1997 (Crane, , 2000a . Hence, whether all marketing decisions are``really'' constitutive of a rational-instrumental process, or are in fact also shaped by organization culture (Crane, 2000a) , careerist competition (Jackall, 1988) , personal creativity (Alvesson, 1994) or whatever else, the dominant rationality of the modern organization imposes the need to justify and frame actions only in those terms (Crane, 2000a) . Thus, the marketing decision-making process tends to exclude, degrade and marginalize morality, since the rationalization of marketing action effectively separates and removes marketing``practitioners'' and``consumers'' from moral considerations and moral action.
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Even if marketers are apparently unwilling (or unable) to acknowledge or embrace moral sensibilities and, moreover, are largely unaware of the terminology and theory (such as it is) of societal marketing, this does not mean that marketing decisions do not have``societal'' outcomes, or even that many firms have not sought to incorporate aspects of societal marketing into their decision process (Abratt and Sacks, 1989) . Although there is only limited empirical evidence attempting specifically to locate corporate practices directly within the discourse of societal marketing (see, however, Abratt and Sacks, 1989) , there are, as we have already acknowledged, burgeoning literatures on green marketing (Kilbourne and Beckmann, 1998) , cause-related marketing (Varadarajan and Menon, 1988; Andreasen, 1996) , and ethical marketing (Smith, 1990; Smith and Quelch, 1993; Crane, 2001 ) among others, which illustrate the wide array of corporate marketing practices aimed at achieving a positive social impact.
There is thus ample evidence to show that social concerns have impacted on various aspects of marketing activity. Many firms have changed product formulations to improve environmental performance (Vandermerwe and Oliff, 1990; Schot, 1992; Schot and Fischer, 1993) ; others have attempted to develop communications campaigns stressing corporate social responsibility (Lill et al., 1986; Banerjee et al., 1995) ; while others have attempted to incorporate charitable donations into their marketing campaigns (Varadarajan and Menon, 1988; Andreasen, 1996) . These are just a handful of the many examples of how such issues have been translated into marketing. However, the above developments do not deflect us from our main argument; to say that social issues can be and have been incorporated into certain marketing activities does not mean that societal marketing is necessarily a more moral or ethical approach to marketing. As we have outlined, the concept is conditional, can result in different outcomes, has no clear location for moral responsibility, and is rationalized in a way that renders its object morally neutral. However, we must stress that our intent and approach in this paper are largely theoretical. There is a need to supplement existing research by asking what forms of discourse (rational-instrumental, religious, utilitarian, deontological) inform those decisions which result in the production of such ostensibly``socially responsible'' offerings such as green products and ethical investments. Does their development actually constitute an entirely new, more responsible product portfolio on the part of producers? Or is it more the case that they simply represent either an attempt to present a more responsible image, or else the ever-widening of existing product portfolios, such that the minority concerns of new segments of so-called``green'' and``ethical'' consumers can also be satisfied along with existing market segments? Evidence suggests the latter, with the green marketing literature in particular showing clear evidence of campaigns based more on extending choice, and with little resort, if any, to moral reflection concerning which products should be marketed, and whether certain products should be marketed at all (Schot and Fischer, 1993; Wong et al., 1996; Peattie, 1999) .
Moreover, it is one thing to say that societal concerns have been incorporated into marketing practice, but it is quite another to suggest that this means that these concerns are viewed as intrinsically moral in nature, or that they are granted some form of moral status that is in any way different from, or above, conventional marketing concerns of profitability, customer satisfaction, customer relationships and the like. Even the marketing of ostensibly``ethical'' products does not, and perhaps cannot, ensure that those involved in the marketing process feel any sense of responsibility or duty to society when dealing with such products (Crane, 1997 (Crane, , 2000a . This suggests that societal marketing, as it is enacted in practice, may be less a moral transformation of marketing and more a minor adjustment or extension to the existing technicist`s cientific'' marketing paradigm.
Conclusion
As a result of the arguments that have been made in this paper, the authors have put forward several reasons to support the view that the societal marketing concept does not form a sufficient basis for a moral reconstruction of marketing. By making visible the process that underpins both the traditional and the societal marketing concepts (which spring from the``Harvard'' view of marketing based on neo-classical economics), they have shown that all these approaches are united by their focus on either psychological or ethical egoism. While ethical egoism can provide a stronger moral basis for marketing than psychological egoism, this concept cannot be regarded as offering a sufficient basis for prescription in terms of marketing morality. This is first because of the difficulty in establishing who should define what the interests of the consumer and of the wider society might be. The second and perhaps more important reason is that the switch from psychological to ethical egoism leaves intact the necessary construction of marketing as a rational-instrumental decision-making process. This ultimately renders its object morally neutral and therefore leaves it open to moral abuse. The moral shortcomings of the SMC have been paralleled by only limited development in the societal marketing literature over the past 25 years. Despite this, the continued, and in many respects growing, concern of marketing practitioners, academics and critics over social, ethical and environmental issues in marketing has illustrated that the problems which the SMC sought to redress have clearly not gone away and, if anything, have probably deepened. In this context, we need to ask where academic research should now proceed. We offer three suggestions.
First, the SMC presupposes that individual products can be determined as being socially valuable or invaluable, as``good'' or``bad'' for consumers' longterm interests. Such attempts are fraught with difficulty, are likely to be highly contestable, and ignore the importance of the way in which products are used and constituted within consumption activities. Whilst the moral terrain of consumption is certainly complex, it provides an essential ethical and behavioural frame for evaluating marketing theory and practice. Work under Societal marketing and morality
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way in exploring aspects of morality, citizenship, social relations and happiness in relation to consumption might thus be very usefully brought to bear on attempts to articulate the social and moral implications of marketing (e.g. Crocker and Linden, 1998; Sulkunen et al., 1997; Borgmann, 2000) . Second, societal marketing theory, and to some extent practice, have thus far adopted limited views of how the public interest can be assessed by marketers, and of how marketing action can be regulated in order to achieve social outcomes. With the growth of corporate size and power, the increasing hollowing-out of the state, and a lack of consumer sovereignty and power (Smith, 1990; Sirgy and Su, 2000) , new models of governance and accountability for marketers need to be developed. We would argue that stakeholder theory is clearly one important avenue for further research in this respect, and there are also important developments in marketing practice concerning stakeholder partnerships (Hartman and Stafford, 1998; Polonsky and Ottman, 1998) , business-business regulation through the supply chain (Preece et al., 1995; Hartman and Stafford, 1998) and transnational regulation of business exchanges.
Finally, given our stated objections to the SMC, we suggest that it may be opportune if more emphasis is now directed in furthering research which seeks to understand those processes and discourses which frame decision making in marketing and consumption, particularly with respect to their moral dimension. This would involve seeking to unravel the complex and often competing discourses on which organizational actors and consumers draw on seeking to justify and implement marketing/consumption decisions. While there are indications that some research is beginning to emerge in this vein, for example, in relation to consumer sovereignty (Knights et al., 1994) and the marketing of``green'' products (Crane, 1997 (Crane, , 2000a , the discipline as a whole is still lacking requisite understanding of the moral meanings and understandings that shape, support and reinforce marketing decision making.
As we have shown, there is a great deal of scope here, since marketing practice (both past and current) is replete with activity focused in one way or another with achieving some degree of positive social benefit. The SMC, in the sense that it is a representation of the self-interested rational-instrumental marketing tradition based on ethical egoism, appears to be alive and well in contemporary organizations. However, descriptive marketing theory in general and descriptive ethics in particular (that is, the examination of everyday moral experience and moral rules-in-use) have failed as yet to sustain a significant stream of research that might provide insight into and illumination on the nature of marketing decision making and marketing work. It is this attempt at understanding the morality embedded in (societal) marketing practices, and not the prescription of a supposedly``ethical'' marketing model, we would argue, that is at present the most apt and useful direction for marketing academics to follow. After all, it is only from understanding that appropriate and meaningful prescription can emerge.
